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Federal Taxation'
by David A. Brennen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During 2002 federal courts in the United States decided nineteen cases
that directly impact federal tax law in the Eleventh Circuit.' These
cases involve a variety of tax law matters including Federal Insurance
Contributions Act ("FICA") payroll tax,2 estate and gift tax, 3 IRS

t @2003 David A. Brennen.
* Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. Florida Atlantic University
(B.B.A., 1988); University of Florida College of Law (J.D., 1991, LL.M., Taxation, 1994).
1. The cases included in this Survey are limited to tax cases decided (or orders issued)
during 2002 by the federal district courts in the Eleventh Circuit, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the United States. See
United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002); United States v. Fior D'Italia, 536 U.S. 238
(2002); Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002); Coggins Auto. Corp. v, Comm'r, 292
F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2002); Comyns v. United States, 287 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2002);
Estate of Atkinson v. Comm'r, 309 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2002); McDonald v. S. Farm
Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718 (11th Cir. 2002); Shepherd v. Comm'r, 283 F.3d 1258
(11th Cir. 2002); Thosteson v. United States, 304 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002); Wilkes v.
United States, 289 F.3d 684 (11th Cir. 2002); Crutcher v. United States, No. CV99-S-3286NE, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3994 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 15, 2002); Estate of O'Neal v. United
States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2002); Friedman v. United States, No. 1:02-CV2461-BBM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2002); Hovind v. Schneider,
No. 3:02CV297/RV/MCR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22918 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002); In re
McDermott, No. 3:01-CV-1387-J-20, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20228 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10,
2002); Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (S.D.
Ala. 2002); Perlman v. United States, No. 00-3703-CIV-GOLD-SIMONTON, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7775 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5,2002); Sillavan v. United States, No. CV-01-BU-803-S, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2127 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2002); United States v. Ratfield, No. 01-8816CIV-FERGUSON, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21450 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2002).
2. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (2000). See FiorD'Italia,536 U.S. 238; McDonald, 291 F.3d 718;
Thosteson, 304 F.3d 1312; Crutcher,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3994; Perlman,2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7775; Sillavan, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2127.
3. See Estate of Atkinson, 309 F.3d 1290; Shepherd, 283 F.3d 1258; Estate of O'Neal,
228 F. Supp. 2d 1290.
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authority to levy and assess tax, 4 and discharges in bankruptcy.5
Other tax-related matters addressed by courts in 2002 that impact tax
law in the Eleventh Circuit include inventory recapture in an Scorporation conversion,' attorney fees for the prevailing party in a tax
dispute,7 and injunctions against tax preparers.'
By far the most
important tax case decided in the Eleventh Circuit was an Alabama
district court case concerning the constitutionality of the new public
disclosure requirements for tax-exempt political organizations.' Of the
nineteen tax cases from 2002, the government prevailed in fourteen,10
the taxpayer prevailed in three," one case was a split decision,1 2 and
one case did not involve suit against the government. 13 This Article
will examine each of these cases by category, pausing along the way to
make observations about trends and themes to the extent they appear.
II.

FICA PAYROLL TAx

The FICA payroll tax cases from 2002 include one Supreme Court
case, United States v. Fior D'Italia,4 two appellate court cases,
McDonald v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co.'" and Thosteson
6
v. United States,"
and two district court cases, Crutcher v. United
7
States and Perlman v. United States.'" FICA payroll tax was by far

4. See Craft, 535 U.S. 274; Comyns, 287 F.3d 1034; Friedman, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23496; Hovind, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22918; Sillavan, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2127.
5. See Young, 535 U.S. 43; In re McDermott, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20228.
6. See Coggins, 292 F.3d 1326.
7. See Wilkes, 289 F.3d 684.
8. See Ratfield, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21450.
9. Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300.
10. See Craft, 535 U.S. 274; FiorD'Italia, 536 U.S. 238; Young, 535 U.S. 43; Comyns,
287 F.3d 1034; Estate ofAtkinson, 309 F.3d 1290; Shepherd, 283 F.3d 1258; Thosteson, 304
F.3d 1312; Crutcher, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3994; Friedman,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496;
Hovind, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22918; In re McDermott, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20228;
Perlman,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7775; Sillavan, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2127; Ratfield, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21450.
11. See Coggins, 292 F.3d 1326; Wilkes, 289 F.3d 684; Estate of O'Neal, 228 F. Supp.
2d 1290.
12. See Nat'l Fed'n of RepublicanAssemblies, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1354-55 (holding that
the challenged statute, § 527(j), is in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional).
13. See McDonald, 291 F.3d 718 (involving suit by an employee against his employer
for failure to pay FICA withholding taxes).
14. 536 U.S. 238 (2002).
15. 291 F.3d 718 (11th Cir. 2002).
16. 304 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
17. No. CV99-S-3286-NE, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3994 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 15, 2002).
18. No. 00-3703-CIV-GOLD-SIMONTON, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7775 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
5, 2002).
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the most frequently litigated tax issue in 2002. This frequent litigation
is likely due to the circumstances under which FICA tax liability arises
for employers and other "responsible" persons. As many of the 2002 tax
cases indicate, the employee pays one-half of the tax to the employer, the
employer holds these funds in trust for the government, and the
employer eventually pays the government both the employee-paid funds
and an additional amount equal to the employee-paid amount. Because
of the trust aspects of the FICA tax payment scheme, the typical risks
associated with a mostly voluntary compliance tax system, and various
aspects of responsible person status, it is not at all surprising that FICA
taxes appear to be the most frequently litigated category of tax.
A. IRS May Use Aggregate Estimates to Determine Employer's FICA
Tax Obligation
In Fior D'Italia the Supreme Court addressed the long-unresolved
matter of the scope of IRS authority to estimate an employer's FICA tax
liability.19 In Fior DItalia the IRS conducted a compliance audit of a
restaurant after discovering a difference between the amount of tips
reported by the restaurant as FICA wages and tips actually shown on
credit card slips. As a result of its audit, the IRS issued an assessment,
based on an aggregate estimate of unreported tips, against the restaurant for additional FICA taxes. Pursuant to the aggregate estimate, the
IRS examined the taxpayer's credit card slips to determine the average
percentage paid as credit card tips, multiplied this average percentage
by total restaurant receipts to come up with an estimate of total tips,
and subtracted tips reported by the restaurant to come up with an
estimate of unreported tips. The IRS applied the FICA tax rate to this
unreported tip amount. The restaurant paid a portion of the assessment
and filed a refund suit in district court. The IRS counterclaimed for the
unpaid portion of the assessment. 20
The issue in FiorD'Italia was whether the IRS is authorized to base
FICA tax assessments on aggregate estimates of tips received by all
employees, or whether the IRS must first determine tip income for each
employee and use that information to calculate the employer's FICA tax
liability.21 The district court and the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the
taxpayer restaurant, concluding that the IRS is not legally authorized
to use aggregate estimates, at least not without first adopting appropriate regulations. Because the Ninth Circuit's decision created a split
19. 536 U.S. at 243.
20. Id at 241-42.
21. Id. at 244.
22. Id. at 242.
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among the circuits,23 the Supreme Court granted the government's
petition for certiorari.24 The Supreme Court concluded that the IRS is
authorized to use aggregate estimates.25 The Court explained that IRS
estimation authority stems from § 6201(a),26 which authorizes the IRS
"to make ...

assessments" of unpaid taxes. 27

This "assessment"

authority, the Court explained, includes the "power to decide how to
make... assessment[s]."' Courts have routinely held that reasonable
29
estimates of tax liability are an appropriate means of assessment.
Thus, concluded the Court, the aggregate estimate is permissible so long
as a reasonable method of calculation is employed. 0
The restaurant argued that because FICA tax is calculated based on
"wages" paid, which are defined as including tips received "by an
employee," the employer's FICA tax liability should be based on each
individual employee's wage, as opposed to an aggregate of all employee
wages.3 1 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the reference
to the singular "employee" is contained in the definition section of the
statute, not the operational section.32 The statute that actually
imposes the tax is the operational section, and it speaks in the plural
referring to wages of employees.3 3
The Supreme Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit's contention that
other tax statutes negatively imply that the IRS lacks authority to
estimate income for purposes of determining FICA tax liability in the
absence of specific statutory or regulatory authority.34 For example,
when a taxpayer does not use an appropriate method of accounting to
calculate taxable income, one tax statute authorizes the IRS to use a
method of accounting that, "in the opinion of the Secretary

...

clearly

refiect[sI income." 5 Additionally, another tax statute permits the IRS
to make "proper adjustments ...

without interest" to the reported

23. See Fior D'Italia, Inc. v. United States, 242 F.3d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2001); 330
West Hubbard Rest. Corp. v. United States, 203 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2000); Bubble
Room, Inc. v. United States, 159 F.3d 553, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Morrison Rest., Inc. v.
United States, 118 F.3d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir. 1997).
24.

536 U.S. at 242.

25. Id.
26. I.R.C.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

§ 6201(a) (2000).

536 U.S. at 243 (quoting I.R.C. § 6201(a)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 245 (referencing I.R.C. §§ 446(b), 6205(a)(1)).

35. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 446(b)).
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amount of FICA taxes when an employer underpays those taxes."8 The
Supreme Court concluded in FiorD'Italiathat these statutes only apply
to small aspects of tax law and say absolutely nothing about particular
methods of calculation.
The Supreme Court also rejected the taxpayer's contention that
several features of aggregate estimates make it "unreasonable" for the
IRS to use this method. s The taxpayer claimed that aggregate
estimates sometimes include tips that should not count for purposes of
calculating the employer's FICA tax liability 9 and that using credit
card slips can overstate tips.'
The Supreme Court rejected these
over-inclusive arguments because the taxpayer had already stipulated
that it did not challenge the accuracy of the IRS estimate of tips in this
case.4 Thus, while the Supreme Court recognized the possibility that
this argument could indicate that an aggregate estimate is unreasonable
in a particular case, the taxpayer restaurant in this case could not make
such a claim.42
Justice Souter's dissent in FiorD'Italia is very persuasive. Indeed,
Justice Souter argued that the government's FICA tax assessment
authority should not exceed what the taxpayer restaurant was required
to report initially as wages for FICA tax purposes.'
B. Employees Do Not Have a Private Right of Action Against
Employers for Failingto Collect FICA Taxes
In McDonald the Eleventh Circuit rejected an insurance agent's
attempt to sue his employer for failure to pay one-half of the FICA tax
imposed on the insurance agent's wages.44 The employer sought to

36. Id. at 246 (quoting I.R.C. § 6205(a)(1)). The regulations indicate that I.R.C.
§ 6205(a)(1) refers to an employer's "adjustments" made before the IRS assesses an
underpayment. Treas. Reg. § 31.6205-1 (2000).
37. 536 U.S. at 245-46.
38. Id. at 246-47.
39. For example, tips less than $20 in a month from an employee and tips that cause
an employee's wages to exceed certain ceiling amounts are not counted as wages of an
employee. Id. at 246.
40. Id. at 247. This is because cash customers tend to tip less than credit card
customers, some customers get cash back from credit card tips, and some restaurants
deduct the credit card company fee from credit card tips. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 247-48.
43. Id. at 253 (Souter, J., dissenting).
44. 291 F.3d at 721. Under FICA, a tax is imposed on employers and workers based
on wages paid to workers. I.R.C. § 3101. If the worker is an employee, the worker pays
one-half of the FICA tax (through withholding) and the employer pays the other half
(through payroll taxes). Id. If the worker is an independent contractor or otherwise
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dismiss the suit, arguing that no private right of action exists under
FICA. 45 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, concluding that Congress did not
intend to allow a private right of action by an employee against his
employer for failure to comply with FICA. 46 The Court explained that
FICA was not enacted for the benefit of employees.4" Instead, FICA is
simply "a tax-assessing statute designed to raise revenue for the federal
government."' Additionally, although FICA and the Social Security
Act4 ("SSA") are linked in that the money raised through the FICA tax
must be used exclusively to fund Social Security, the purposes of the two
statutes are different.50 The court reasoned that "FICA assesses a tax
on employers and employees in order to fund a government program.""'
Conversely, "the SSA ... provides funds for disabled and retired

employees." 2 Thus, a qualifying employee receives SSA benefits even
if his employer has not complied with FICA. 3 Therefore, an employee
does not need to sue his employer to collect SSA benefits because their
availability does not depend on the employer's FICA compliance.
C.

"ResponsiblePersons"Can Be Held Liable for Payment of FICA
Taxes Even if Another Person is Also Liable
The next group of FICA cases involved "responsible" persons, such as
officers and shareholders of an employer, who were held liable for FICA
taxes that were not paid by the employer as the primary obligor. When
a company fails to pay FICA taxes withheld from employee wages,
§ 6672(a) imposes a penalty equal to the total amount of the unpaid tax
on a "responsible person," who is "[any person required to collect,
truthfully account for, and pay over" the tax. 4 A responsible person
can include any person who, based on her status in the business, has the

self-employed, the worker pays both the employee's portion of the tax and the employer's
portion. Id. The employer does not have to pay any FICA excise tax for these workers.
Id.
Because defendant employer classified taxpayer as an independent contractor, it did not
pay any excise taxes. 291 F.3d at 721. Instead, taxpayer paid one hundred percent of his
FICA tax. Id.
45. 291 F.3d at 722.
46. Id. at 726.
47. Id. at 723.
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1399jj (2000).
50. 291 F.3d at 723-24.
51. Id. at 724.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. I.R.C. § 6672(a).
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actual authority or ability to pay the tax.55 Thus, factors to consider
when deciding if a person is a responsible person include whether the
person holds corporate office, controls financial matters, has authority
to disburse corporate funds, owns stock in the company, or has authority
to hire and fire employees.5 6 Once an individual is established as a
responsible person, she then has the burden of proving that her failure
to pay FICA taxes was not willful.5 7 The willfulness requirement is
satisfied if the responsible person knows of payments to other creditors

after becoming aware of the failure to pay the taxes.58 The following

three responsible person FICA cases demonstrate that it is nearly
impossible for officers and shareholders to avoid liability for unpaid
FICA taxes, even when another person is primarily liable for the tax.
In Thosteson the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a taxpayer who was
an officer, employee, and shareholder of his employer could not avoid
liability as a responsible person by claiming that another person was
primarily responsible for the payment of the withheld taxes." After
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the taxpayer employee, the trial
judge granted the government's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the jury's verdict.60 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the taxpayer's
assertions that he could not be held liable as a responsible person
because another person-the majority shareholder-was primarily

55. Id.
56. Thosteson, 304 F.3d at 1318.
57. Id. at 1317.
58. Id. at 1318.
59. Id. Taxpayer in Thosteson was an incorporator and vice-president for his employer.
Taxpayer's responsibilities included sales, "growing" the business, hiring and firing
employees, determining financial policy, setting salaries, paying employees, entering loan
agreements, signing tax returns, opening bank accounts, and serving as signatory on bank
accounts for up to a specified maximum amount. While taxpayer wrote checks for more
than the specified maximum, none of these above-the-maximum checks was dishonored,
and at least one was honored. Taxpayer also signed some of his employer's withholding
tax returns. Taxpayer was also a minority shareholder of his employer and eventually
became president. Taxpayer knew that his employer had failed to pay its taxes.
Nevertheless, taxpayer continued to write checks to other creditors. Taxpayer emphasized
the role of the former sole shareholder, who had also been sued by the government but
disappeared. Taxpayer claimed that this former sole shareholder was not only the sole
stockholder for a while, but he and his wife also controlled all major decisions within the
business. Taxpayer further claimed that he was hospitalized when he found out the taxes
had not been paid. After finding out about the tax liability, taxpayer claimed that he used
his best efforts to establish a repayment plan by arranging for his employer to make
weekly payments of $30,000 to the IRS. However, after making only three such payments,
taxpayer claimed that his efforts were frustrated by the former sole shareholder, who
stopped the tax restitution payments. Id. at 1315.
60. Id. at 1314.
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responsible for the payment of the withheld FICA taxes.6 ' The
Eleventh Circuit explained that a company can have more than one
responsible person.62 Additionally, the taxpayer's claims that the
majority shareholder interfered with the taxpayer's attempted payment
negate the taxpayer's willfulness so as to
of the back taxes did not
63
pay.
to
failure
the
excuse
In Crutcher the district court also concluded that a responsible person
is not relieved of liability because another person is primarily responsible for the tax, even if the taxpayer does not actually know that the tax
is unpaid." The taxpayer in Crutcher was a minority stockholder,
officer, director, and employee of a corporation that failed to pay its
FICA tax. The taxpayer alleged that his brother, the president and
majority stockholder in the company, was in control of the company and
its in-house accounting staff. Although taxpayer secured contracts for
the company and had check-writing authority, he would only sign checks
when his brother was unavailable. Even then, the taxpayer often would
not know who the payees of these checks were because his brother had
authorized the checks. In fact, the taxpayer never authorized accounting
employees to prepare checks for the payment of creditors. For example,
when the company experienced cash flow problems, which left it unable
to cover expenses or secure bank loans, taxpayer learned of this
predicament along with other employees when his brother distributed a
memorandum. 5 Also, taxpayer's brother, not taxpayer, signed and
filed the company's tax returns.6 Despite his brother having superior
knowledge of the tax delinquency, the court concluded that the taxpayer
could not escape liability as a responsible person by claiming that his
brother had ultimate control over tax payment matters.67 Instead, the
court noted that the taxpayer's failure to take steps to ensure payment
of withholding taxes is "reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk"
that withheld taxes may not be paid."
Finally, in Perlman, the district court concluded that a taxpayer can
be presumed liable as a responsible person based solely on his status

61. Id. at 1318.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1319.
64. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3994, at *25-28.
65. Id. at *6-10. On January 5, 1997, taxpayer's brother notified taxpayer and others
within the company that"cash flow problems... resulted in unpaid withholding taxes" and
that "the company ha[d] approached the IRS to work out a payment arrangement." Id. at
*10.

66. Id. at *12.
67. Id. at *27-28.
68. Id. at *34.
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with the company" The taxpayer in Perlman was a majority shareholder and director who guaranteed loans for the company, had the
authority to hire and fire and to authorize payment of bills, and
determined financial policy.' The taxpayer knew that the company's
payroll taxes were delinquent. During the time the company was not
paying its payroll taxes, it was paying its debts to other creditors. The
taxpayer failed to present evidence in support of his claim that he was
not liable for the taxes because he lacked authority over the company's
affairs and had no knowledge of its failure to pay the taxes.7" Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit explained in Harris v. United States71 that
"liability attaches to any person who, based on her status in the
corporation, has 'actual authority or ability' to pay the taxes." 72 The
government established that the taxpayer was a responsible person
because of his authority to sign checks, to hire and fire employees,
manage the company, determine financial policy, and pay bills.73 In
addition, the taxpayer owned a majority of the corporation's stock and
was a member of the corporation's board.74 Although taxpayer did not
exercise all of this authority regularly, the court concluded that it was
the existence of the authority that created a presumption of liability not
whether the authority was exercised." Because the presumption was
not rebutted and the taxpayer acquiesced in the company's payment to
other creditors while the taxes remained unpaid, the taxpayer was held
liable for the FICA tax as a responsible person.76
III.

ESTATE AND GIFT TAX

The estate and gift tax cases from 2002 include two appellate court
cases, Estate of Atkinson v. Commissioner77 and Shepherd v. Commissioner," and one district court case, Estate of O'Neal v. United
States.79 Estate of Atkinson concerned an estate's eligibility for a

69.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 775, at *15.

Id. at *16-17.
175 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1321.
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7775, at *16-17.
Id. at *17.

Id.

Id. at *18.

77. 309 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2002).

78. 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002).
79. 228 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
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charitable estate tax deduction.8" Shepherd and Estate of O'Neal
concerned estate and gift tax valuation issues.8 '
A. Estate Tax CharitableDeduction Denied For Trust Not Operated
in Strict Compliance with CRAT Rules
In Estate of Atkinson the court emphasized the importance of a trust
operating in compliance with statutory requirements if the trust
purports to be a charitable remainder annuity trust.8 2 Section 2001
imposes a federal estate tax on "the transfer of the taxable estate of
every decedent." 3 In computing the amount of the "taxable estate," a
deduction is generally allowed for the portion of the estate directly
devised to charity.84 When a decedent donates a remainder interest in
property to charity, the deductible interest must pass to the charity in
the context of a "charitable remainder annuity trust" ("CRAT"), a
"charitable remainder unitrust," or a "pooled income fund."8 5
In Estate of Atkinson .the decedent intended to create a CRAT. 6 By
statute, a CRAT requires that certain minimum amounts be paid
annually to noncharitable beneficiaries for specified periods before the
remainder is paid to charity.8 7 The CRAT is required to pay the
noncharitable annuity from the first year of its existence.8 8 However,
in Estate of Atkinson, one of the noncharities did not receive annuity
payments as called for in the trust documents. 89 Because the trust "did
not adhere to the CRAT [rules] throughout its existence," the Eleventh
Circuit held that the charitable remainder interest did not qualify the
estate for a charitable deduction." The court rejected the estate's
argument that because no interest ever passed to both noncharitable
beneficiaries and to charity, the CRAT rules did not apply.9 The court

80.
81.
82.
83.

309 F.3d at 1291-92.
283 F.3d at 1259-60; 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
309 F.3d at 1293.
I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2000).

84. See id. § 2055(a)(2).
85.

See id. § 2055(eX2)(A).

86. 309 F.3d at 1293. Decedent created a trust that provided that decedent receive a
lifetime annuity and that, at her death, the annuity would be divided between four other
beneficiaries for their lifetimes, provided that those beneficiaries agreed to pay their share

of any estate taxes due at decedent's death. After the death of the last beneficiary, any
amount remaining in the trust would be donated to charity. Id.
87. I.R.C. § 664(d)(1).
88. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.664-1(aX4) and 1.664-2(aX5) (2000).
89. 309 F.3d at 1292. The Tax Court determined that no annuity payments were ever
actually made to decedent during her life from the assets of the trust. Id.

90. Id. at 1296.
91. Id.
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explained that for purposes of the estate tax charitable deduction,
property interests transferred inter vivos are considered to pass
immediately from the decedent to the recipient.92
B.

Valuation For EG&T Purposes

In 2002 two federal courts addressed issues related to valuation. The
first valuation case, Shepherd v. Commissioner, 93 involved the issue of
whether gifts of land should be valued for gift tax purposes as gifts of
land or whether they should be valued as gifts of minority partnership
interests.9 4 If valued as gifts of minority partnership interests, the
valuation takes into account minority and marketability discounts
attributable to the gift recipients' minority status in the partnership. 95
However, if valued as gifts of land, the valuation does not consider these
discounts.9 6 The second valuation case, Estate of O'Neal v. United
States,97 concerned the valuation of claims against a decedent's estate
when the value of the claim stems from pending tax court litigation."
In Shepherd the taxpayer executed a partnership agreement creating
a partnership between the taxpayer and his sons. The sons owned
minority interests in the partnership. On the same day that he executed
the partnership agreement, the taxpayer deeded land to the partnership.
However, at the time the father deeded the land to the partnership, the
partnership had not yet been formed because the sons did not execute
the partnership agreement until the next day. On his gift tax return,
the taxpayer reported the transfer as gifts of land to his sons and valued
them accordingly. In response to a notice of deficiency, however, the
taxpayer argued that these gifts were overvalued on his return. Instead,
taxpayer contended that the gifts were of partnership interests, which
should be valued taking into account minority and marketability
discounts.99
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the gifts were of land, not of
partnership interests."0 The court explained that the taxpayer not
only reported the gifts as gifts of land on his gift tax return, but also
referred to the gifts as undivided interests in land in his initial petition

92. Id. at 1295; see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-1(a)(5).
93.

283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002).

94. Id. at 1260.
95. Shepherd v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 376, 383-84 (2000).
96. 283 F.3d at 1262-63.
97. 228 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2002).

98. Id. at 1292.
99. 283 F.3d at 1260-61.
100. Id. at 1260.
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for review in the tax court.'0 ' Additionally, because the partnership
necessarily must have been created before the deed became effective (one
cannot give land to a nonexistent partnership), the taxpayer's sons
obtained their interests in the leased land only "'by virtue of their status
as partners in the partnership. "' ' 2 Thus, the court concluded that the
taxpayer "created a partnership in which his sons held established
shares and then gave the partnership," and hence the minority partners
as individuals, taxable gifts of land.' °
In Estate of O'Neal decedent's estate sought a refund of estate taxes
paid based on claims against the estate that were pending in tax court
at decedent's death.0 4 The claims stemmed from transferee taxes
owed by the estate as a result of gifts decedent made prior to death. In
the transferee tax case, the tax court concluded that the gift recipients
were liable for the gift tax, leaving only the valuation issue unresolved.
Both parties in the tax court case hired experts to determine the value
of the gifts. Shortly thereafter, decedent died and the parties settled the
tax court case. The district court in the estate tax case issued an order
holding that decedent's estate was entitled to a § 2053(a) deduction for
the tax court claim and that the amount of the deduction should be fixed
by the post-death settlement of the tax court case. 0 5 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that the deduction should be determined
without taking into account events that occurred after decedent's
death.0 6 The Eleventh Circuit then remanded the valuation issue to
the district court.'0 7
On remand decedents estate established the status of the tax court
proceeding at the time of decedents death through the testimony of the
estate's attorney and documents from those proceedings. The estate
then offered expert testimony on the value of the claims as of decedent's
death.' 8 The experts testified about "the date-of-death value of the
claims ...

based upon the likely outcome of the ...

[tax court case]

given the facts known as of... [decedent's] death."'" The experts
then discounted that value to reflect contingencies related to possible
litigation between decedent and the donees."0 The district court

101.
102.
103.
104.
105,
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 1261 (quoting Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 387).
Id. (footnote omitted).
228 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
Id. at 1292-95.
Id. at 1295.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id
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determined that the experts were qualified to render opinions on value
and, accordingly, permitted the estate to take a deduction for the claim
in an amount sufficient to eliminate the estate's tax liability."'
IV. IRS LEVY AND ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
A number of the federal tax cases from 2002 concerned IRS authority
to levy and assess tax. The topics covered by these cases include the
types of property the IRS may levy against" 2 and the extent to which
the IRS may involve third parties in its collection and enforcement
These cases reflect the broadness of IRS levy and assessefforts.'
ment authority in terms of being able to levy against just about any
property interest over which the taxpayer has certain levels of control,
being able to choose the most liquid assets to levy against, and being
able to involve even unwilling third parties in collection efforts.
A.

IRS May Levy Against Entirety Property and IRAs

In United States v. Craft,"4 the Supreme Court held that a tax lien
against the taxpayer's "property" and "rights to property" also imposed
a lien on taxpayer's interest in property held as tenant by the entirety." 5' In Craft a tax lien attached to taxpayer husband's property and
rights to property when he failed to pay federal income tax liabilities
assessed by the IRS." 6 At the time the lien attached, husband and
wife owned, as tenants by the entirety, real property located in
Michigan. After the lien attached, husband and wife quitclaimed the
husband's interest to the wife. Years later, when the wife attempted to
sell the property, the IRS consented to release its lien and permit the
sale as long as the wife agreed to place one-half of the net proceeds from
the sale in an escrow account pending a determination about the government's interest in the property. The wife sued in federal district court
to quiet title to the escrow proceeds.

111. Id.at 1302, 1305.
112. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (entirety property); Sillavan v.
United States, No. CV-01-BU-803-5, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2127 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2002)
(IRAs).
113. See Comyns v. United States, 287 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2002) (disclose taxpayer
information to third parties); Hovind v. Schneider, No. 3:02cv297/RV/MCR, 2002 U.S.
District LEXIS 22918 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (entering a third party's property); Friedman v.
United States, No. 1:02-CV-2461-BBM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24,
2002) (jeopardy assessment against payments from third party).
114. 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
115. Id. at 288.
116. Id. at 276; see I.R.C. § 6321 (2000).
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In the district court, the government claimed that its lien had attached
to the husband's entirety interest. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the government and held that the transfer to the
wife destroyed the tenancy by the entirety and entitled the government
to one-half of the value of the property. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
held that because the husband lacked any individual interest in the
property under state law, the tax lien did not attach to the property.'17
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the
government's claim that the.., husband had a separate interest in the
entireties property to which the federal tax lien attached."1 8
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, concluding that despite
state law to the contrary, each tenant by entirety possesses individual
rights sufficient to constitute property or rights to property for the
purposes of the tax lien. 9 The Court explained that it is appropriate
to look to state law to determine taxpayer's rights in property. 120 The
Court explained, however, that it is equally appropriate to look to federal
law to determine whether taxpayer's state-defined rights qualify as
property or rights to property for federal tax lien purposes. 12 ' The
applicable state law provided that the husband's rights in entirety
property included some of the most essential property rights such as the
right to use, receive income from, and exclude others from the property.122 The applicable federal law provides that the tax lien "'is broad
and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest in
property that a taxpayer might have. '""2' The Court explained that
these essential state property rights gave the husband a substantial
degree of control over the entirety property.'24 Accordingly, "[tihese
rights alone may be sufficient to subject the husband's interest in the
entirety property to the federal tax lien."'25 However, in addition to

117. 535 U.S. at 276-77.
118. Id. at 278.
119. Id. at 288.

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 281. State law in Michigan provides that the husband's rights with respect
to entirety property include (a) use of the property, (b) the right to exclude third parties
from the property, (c) a share of income produced from the property, (d) the right of
survivorship, (e) the right to become a tenant in common with equal shares upon divorce,
(f)the right to sell the property with the wife's consent and to receive half the proceeds,
(g) the right to encumber the property with the wife's consent, (h) the right to block wife
from selling or encumbering the property unilaterally. Id. at 283-84.
123. Id. at 283 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 719-20
(1985)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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these control rights, the husband also has the right to sell the property
and a right of survivorship with respect to the property.126 Thus, the
properly attached to the husband's interest
Court held that the tax lien
127
in the entirety property.

In Sillavan v. United States," the district court held that the IRS
may properly levy upon a taxpayer's IRA funds when no other liquid
assets are readily available for levy.121 In Sillavan the taxpayer
sought a redetermination of an IRS administrative decision that would
allow the IRS to levy on two of taxpayer's IRAs to satisfy a tax liability.
The IRS assessed the tax liability against the taxpayer as a responsible
person pursuant to § 6672.3 for payroll taxes that had not been paid.
During the collections process, the taxpayer transferred his interest in
his residence to his wife. After the transfer, the taxpayer consented to
assessment and collection of the tax penalty. The IRS then indicated
that it intended to collect the tax liability through a levy against two of
taxpayer's IRAs. Later, the IRS filed a tax lien against the taxpayer's
wife's residence to secure the tax penalty against the husband. After an
administrative hearing concerning the intent to levy on the IRA
accounts, the IRS Appeals Officer explained that he considered several
proposed alternatives to the levy against the IRA, but concluded that
none of the alternatives was appropriate.' 3' The district court affirmed
the IRS determination, concluding that no realistic alternative to levy
against the IRAs existed." 2 Because of the uncertainty of taxpayer's
future income".. and his interest in the residence, the court rejected
taxpayer's claims that an installment agreement or collection against the

126. Id. at 283-84.
127. Id. at 288. Justice Thomas's dissent is very persuasive because he argues that the
government's lien rights should not be any broader than a husband's ownership rights. Id.
at 291 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128. No. CV-01-BU-803-5, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2127 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2002).
129. Id. at *19.
130. I.R.C. § 6672.
131. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2127, at *2-6. Specifically, the Appeals Officer considered
three alternatives: levy against other assets, an installment agreement, and an offer-incompromise. The Appeals Officer rejected each of these alternatives because taxpayer
claimed that he had no assets other than the IRA and whatever interest he retained in his
residence, that his monthly expenses exceeded his monthly income, and that his assets
exceeded his tax liability. Id. at *6.
132. Id. at *19.
133. Sections 6159 and 301.6159-1 of the Treasury Regulations authorize the IRS to
enter into installment agreements to satisfy a federal tax liability. However, the IRS is not
required to do so here because taxpayer's liability is not for income taxes arising under
Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code and the aggregate amount of his liability exceeds
$10,000. See I.R.C. § 6159(c)(1).
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proceeds from the sale of this residence were viable alternative collection
methods." Thus, the district court held that the IRS Appeals Officer
did not abuse
his discretion by approving the levy against the IRA
35
accounts.1

B. The IRS May Involve Third Partiesin its Collection and
Enforcement Efforts
Three cases from 2002, Comyns v. United States,"6 Friedman v.
United States,'37 and Hovind v. Schneider' concerned the extent to
which the IRS may involve third parties in its tax collection and
enforcement efforts.
In Comyns the Eleventh Circuit concluded that IRS agents will not be
held liable for disclosing confidential taxpayer information to third
parties so long as the IRS complies with its investigation procedures and
training." 9 A taxpayer is permitted to sue any agent of the government who improperly discloses confidential taxpayer information to third
parties. 40 However, the agent is not liable for the disclosure if it is
made in good faith."" In a case of first impression, the Eleventh
Circuit held that following IRS procedures and training satisfies the
good faith requirement exception to § 7431(a) "because those procedures
constitute a reasonable interpretation of the law by the IRS." 42 Thus,
the IRS agents may disclose confidential taxpayer information to third
parties so long as they do not violate IRS procedures in doing so."
In Friedman a federal district court concluded that the IRS may use
its jeopardy assessment authority to collect monies owed to a delinquent
taxpayer by a third party.'" Under its jeopardy assessment authority,
"if the Secretary... makes a finding that the collection of any tax is in
jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment of such tax may be

134. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2127, at *15. Regarding collecting from the sales proceeds
of the residence, the court also explained that the IRS lien against taxpayer's wife's
interest, as taxpayer's nominee, could be subject to legal challenge by taxpayer's wife if she
were to assert that the transfer of taxpayer's interest to her was bona fide and that she
was not his nominee. Id. at *18.
135. Id. at *20-21.
136. 287 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2002).
137. No. 1:02-CV-2461-BBM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2002).
138. No. 3:02cv297/RV/MCR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22918 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002).
139. 287 F.3d at 1034.
140. See I.R.C. § 7431(a). Improper disclosure is defined by I.R.C. § 6103(a).
141. See id. § 7431(b).
142. 287 F.3d at 1034.
143. Id.
144. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *23.
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made.. . and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection thereof
by levy shall be lawful without regard to the 10-day period allowed for
notice and demand." 4 Within five days after the levy is imposed, the
IRS must provide the delinquent taxpayer a written statement of the
basis for the levy.'
After the statement is furnished, the taxpayer
may request a review of the levy and, thereafter, file an action in district
court seeking review of the levy.147 After the filing, the district court
is required to determine whether the levy is reasonable." 4 A jeopardy
levy is reasonable if the taxpayer appears to be -planning to leave the
United States, if the taxpayer appears to be planning to place his
property "beyond the reach of the Government," or if the taxpayer is
becoming insolvent.49 Taxpayer in Friedman filed a motion to
determine the reasonableness of the IRS jeopardy assessment on
taxpayer's money due from a third party. The court concluded in
Friedmanthat taxpayer's financial solvency was properly found to be
imperiled because taxpayer had failed to pay taxes or file returns for
several years. 5
Finally, in Hovind, a federal district court held that the IRS may enter
a third person's property in order to investigate a taxpayer's tax
liability.'
In Hovind an IRS agent conducting an investigation into
federal income tax liabilities went onto a third person's property to serve
several summons. Despite a posted "No Trespassing" notice, the IRS
agent entered the property without obtaining prior consent and served
the summons. The third party sought to enjoin the IRS from trespassing
on his property.'52 The federal district court held that the injunction
was barred by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act,' which provides that "'no
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court by any person.'"'5 4 Because the
actions the third party sought to enjoin would impair IRS attempts to
assess and collect taxes owed by the taxpayer, the court concluded that
the Anti-Injunction Act was applicable.'55 While the Anti-Injunction
Act provides for statutory exceptions, the third party did not assert that

145. Id. at *16-17. See I.R.C. § 6331(a).

146. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *17. See I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1)(B).
147. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *17. See I.R.C. §§ 7429(aX2), (b)(1)-(2).
148. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *18. See I.R.C. §§ 7429(b)(3), (c).

149. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *22.
150. Id. at *22-23.
151. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22918, at *6.
152. Id. at *3-4.
153. I.R.C. § 7421(a).
154. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22918, at *4 (quoting I.R.C. § 7421(a)).

155. Id. at *6.
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any of the exceptions applied.'5 6 Because the party seeking an injunction bears the burden of demonstrating that an exception applies and
because the third party failed to do so, the district court dismissed the
third party's injunction action.'
V. BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
Two of the federal tax cases decided in 2002, Young v. United

6
and In re McDermott,159 concerned the ability of taxpayers
States"
to have their tax liabilities discharged in bankruptcy. More specifically,
these bankruptcy discharge cases addressed the issue of the time at
which a tax lien is discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. The two
aspects of the timing issue addressed in these cases were the tolling of
the three-year lookback period and the due date of a tax return. The
essence of these cases is that a taxpayer may not use bankruptcy to
avoid tax liability by either artfully filing successive bankruptcy actions
or by filing a needless automatic extension to create uncertainty about
a tax return's "due date" for bankruptcy statute of limitations purposes.

A. The Three-year Lookback Periodin Bankruptcy is Tolled During
Pendency of a PriorBankruptcy Petition
One determinant of the time at which a tax lien is discharged in
bankruptcy is the three-year lookback period. The three-year lookback
period provides that a discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish tax
liabilities for which a return was due within three years before the filing
of an individual debtor's bankruptcy petition."8° The issue before the
Supreme Court in Young was whether this three-year period is tolled
during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition.'' If the threeyear period is tolled during the prior proceeding, a bankrupt taxpayer
cannot file successive bankruptcy petitions as a means of preventing the
government from filing tax liens for unpaid tax assessments. If the
three-year period is not tolled during the prior proceeding, a bankrupt
taxpayer might be able to prevent the IRS from filing the lien, thus
effectively discharging the tax liability in bankruptcy.'62 The Supreme

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
535 U.S. 43 (2002).
No. 3:01-CV-1387-J-20, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20228 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2002).
11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)(A) and 507(a)(8)(A)(i) (2000).
535 U.S. at 44.
Id. at 48-49.
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Court in Young held that the three-year period is indeed tolled during
the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition.6
In Young the bankrupt taxpayers filed a tax return for 1992 but did
not include payment with the return, which was due in October 1993.
The IRS assessed the 1992 tax liability in 1994. In 1994 and 1995, the
bankrupt taxpayers made some payments on the assessment for 1992
but stopped making payments in 1996 after filing for Chapter 13
bankruptcy. At the time of their Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing, a portion
of the 1992 tax liability remained due. Before a reorganization plan was
confirmed, the bankrupt taxpayers moved to dismiss their Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition. In 1997, one day before the bankruptcy court
dismissed the Chapter 13 petition, the taxpayers filed a new bankruptcy
petition under Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court granted a discharge
under this second petition on June 17, 1997, and closed the case on
September 22, 1997. Later, the IRS demanded payment of the 1992 tax
debt, but the taxpayers refused to pay, claiming that payment was
barred by the three-year lookback period because the tax debt related to
a return due more than three years prior to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy
filing. The bankruptcy court refused to declare the tax debt discharged,
explaining that although the tax return was due more than three years
before the Chapter 7 petition, it was due less than three years before the
1996 Chapter 13 petition. The bankruptcy court agreed with the
government, concluding that the "three-year lookback period" is tolled
during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition.'
The Supreme
Court affirmed. 6'
The Court in Young rejected the taxpayers' argument that the threeyear lookback period is a substantive component of bankruptcy law, and
not a mere procedural limitations period."
The taxpayers argued
that because the lookback period begins on the date the tax return is
due, not on the date the IRS discovers or assesses the unpaid tax, the
effect is that the IRS may have less than three years to protect itself
from discharge of a tax debt in bankruptcy.'6 7 The Court disagreed
with this argument because otherwise all statutes of limitations would
be rendered substantive. 6' The Court also noted that all limitations
periods are subject to equitable tolling, unless tolling is "'inconsistent

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 47.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 48,
Id. at 49-50.
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with the text of the relevant statute.'" 9 The Court recognized that
equitable tolling typically applies "where the claimant has actively
pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the
statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced.., by his
adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass."'70
However, the Court noted that tolling may also be appropriate in a case
like Young when the Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition creates an
automatic stay that prevents the IRS from collecting, or filing a lien for,
Because taxpayers filed the Chapter 7 petition before
its tax debt.'
court
dismissed the Chapter 13 petition, according to the
the bankruptcy
period be tolled during the
Court, equity required that the limitations
1 72
pendency of the Chapter 13 petition.
Finally, the Court in Young rejected each of taxpayers' claims that
certain statutory provisions precluded tolling. 73 Thus, the Court
rejected the argument that § 523(b), which permits discharge in a
Chapter 7 case of debts that were "excepted from discharge" in a prior
Chapter 13 case, prevents tolling. 74 The Court explained that taxpayers' tax debt here was not "excepted from discharge" in the Chapter 13,
but was instead dismissed by the bankruptcy court before discharge. 7 '
The Court also rejected taxpayers' argument that, by negative
implication, two statutes prevent tolling-§ 108(c)(1)176 (tolling in

nonbankruptcy courts) and § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) 177 (240-day lookback
period for offers-in-compromise). 71 With regard to § 108(c)(1), taxpayers argued that explicit tolling for nonbankruptcy courts indicates that
if Congress wanted to provide for tolling in bankruptcy courts, it would
have. 79 The Court refused to draw any such negative inference,
concluding that it would not be unreasonable for Congress to provide for
tolling in nonbankruptcy contexts, while at the same time assuming that
bankruptcy courts would use their inherent equitable powers for
tolling."s With regard to § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii), the taxpayers again argued
by negative implication that the presence of explicit tolling for the

169.
170.

Id. (quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998) (citations omitted)).
Id. at 50 (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).

171.

Id.

172.

Id. at 50-51.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 50-51.
11 U.S.C. § 108(c)(1) (2000).
Id. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).
535 U.S. at 52-53.
Id. at 52.
Id.
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240-day lookback period precluded tolling in Young, primarily because
the 240-day period is contained in the same subsection as the three-year
period.'' The Court also rejected this second negative implication
argument because equitable tolling cannot apply to the 240-day period,
which only applies when a claimant voluntarily chooses not to protect
rights by entering into an "offer-in-compromise."8 2 Thus, it made
sense, according to the Court, that explicit tolling be incorporated into
the statute. 1"
B. Automatic Extension Determines the Due Date of the Return for
Purposes of Determining Discharge in Bankruptcy
In addition to the three-year lookback period, another determinant of
the time at which a tax lien is discharged in bankruptcy is the due date
of the underlying tax return. As previously explained, taxes are
excepted from discharge if they are "'for a taxable year ending on or
before the date of filing of the petition for which a return ...is last due,
including extensions, after three years before the date of the filing of the
petition."''1 For purposes of this three-year lookback period, "'the due
date of the return is dispositive and the date the return is actually filed
is immaterial'" in determining whether a debtor's tax obligation is
dischargeable.
Thus, the lookback period begins on the date the tax
is "last due, including extensions," not the date the return is filed if the
The issue in In re McDermott8 7 was
extension was not used."
whether an automatic extension that turns out to be unnecessary
determines the due date of the return for purposes of this three-year
lookback period.'
On April 15, 1997, the bankrupt taxpayers in McDermott filed an
automatic extension request with the IRS, along with their 1996 tax
return and partial payment of their 1996 tax liability. The automatically extended due date for the 1996 tax return was August 15, 1997, four
months after the regular due date. 9 The bankrupt taxpayers filed a
bankruptcy petition on May 4, 2000 (three years and two weeks after
filing their 1996 tax return but less than three years before the

181. Id. at 53.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. In re McDermott, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20228, at *4 (quoting In re Wood, 78 B.R.
316, 320 (M.D. Fla. 1989)). See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).
185, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20228, at *4 (quoting In re Wood, 78 B.R. at 320).
186. Id.at *4-5.
187. Id. at *3.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *2.See 26 C.F.R. 1.6081-4(aX2)-(4) (2000).
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automatically extended filing deadline). In the bankruptcy proceeding,
the bankrupt taxpayers sought to discharge their 1996 tax liability,
claiming that the extension application was mooted because of their
timely 1996 tax return. Taxpayers also argued that the extension
application was not valid because it did not accurately identify the
amount due. Thus, the bankrupt taxpayers argued that the "due date"
for purposes of the three-year lookback rule was the date the return was
filed, April 15, because the extension turned out to be unnecessary and
invalid. Because more than three years passed between this due date
(April 15, 1997) and their bankruptcy filing (May 4, 2000), taxpayers
claimed that the bankruptcy case discharged their 1996 tax liability.'90
The bankruptcy court agreed with taxpayers, and the government
9
appealed to the district court.9'
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court. 92 The district
court rejected the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the bankrupt
taxpayers' extension was invalid due to its failure to properly indicate
an estimate of taxes due. 98 The district court explained that the cases
relied on by the bankruptcy court involved the IRS taking affirmative
steps to deny taxpayers' extensions while in this case the government
never notified the bankrupt taxpayers that their extension was invalid
or void. 94 Even if the extension was voidable due to the taxpayers'
failure to make a good-faith estimate of their tax liability, the district
court explained that only the government can-at its discretion-void
the automatic extension.'9 5 The district court concluded that the
automatic extension was not voided merely because the bankrupt
taxpayers' application inaccurately estimated their tax."9 6 The district
court also explained that even if the extension was unnecessary and
taxpayers did not benefit from it, they would benefit considerably from
a declaration that their extension application was invalid because of an
inaccurate estimate of tax due.' 97 Thus, the district court concluded
that "it would be unfair to allow [the bankrupt taxpayers) to benefit
from circumstances driven by their own blatant noncompliance with the
IRS regulations for seeking extensions." 95

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20228, at *4.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *10-11.
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OTHER TAX CASES

In addition to cases concerning FICA, estate and gift tax, IRS levy
authority, and bankruptcy discharge, the federal courts also decided
three cases in 2002 that do not fit within these categories.
A. A ParentDoes Not Own its Subsidiary's Inventory for Purposes of
Sub-chapter S LIFO Recapture
In Coggin Automotive Corp. v. Commissioner,'" the Eleventh Circuit
held that a holding company is not treated as an additional owner of its
susidiaries' inventory for purposes of the sub-chapter S last-in first-out
("LIFO") recapture provisions. 200 A C-corporation that elects S-corporation status and that used the LIFO inventory method for its last taxable
year prior to the election must recapture and include in gross income the
difference between the LIFO inventory method and the first-in first-out
("FIFO") inventory method. 2 1' The purpose of this provision is to
supplement and strengthen the built-in gains tax provisions of
§ 1374.202 In Coggin the taxpayer, a holding company, operated as a
C-corporation that owned majority interests in five subsidiary
C-corporations. The subsidiaries owned inventories of vehicles for sale
in their automobile dealerships. The subsidiaries elected to maintain
these inventories using LIFO accounting. 0 3 The taxpayer never owned
inventory directly and, hence, never made a LIFO inventory election. To
facilitate a corporate restructuring, the taxpayer converted from Ccorporation status to S-corporation status.0 4 The tax court held that
as a result of the conversion, the taxpayer had to include in income its
share of LIFO recaptured reserves. 0 5 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the tax court, ruling that the taxpayer did not own inventory
and, thus, could not be subjected to the LIFO recapture rules. 06 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the tax court's reliance on legislative history,
explaining that resort to legislative history was not appropriate because
the plain language of the LIFO recapture statute provides that the

199.
200.
201.
202.

292 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1333-34; see I.R.C. § 1363 (2000).
292 F.3d at 1329; see I.R.C. § 1363(d).
292 F.3d at 1330.

203. Id. at 1328-29; see I.R.C. § 472. Under LIFO the cost of the most recently acquired
goods is subtracted from current revenue to determine profit from inventory sales. 292
F.3d at 1330.
204. 292 F.3d at 1331.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1333.

1586

[Vol. 54

MERCER LAW REVIEW

electing corporation must have owned inventory."7 Thus, because the
taxpayer did not own inventory, it could not be held liable for the LIFO
recapture tax. 0 8
B. Case of FirstImpression Does Not Render IRS Prosecution
SubstantiallyJustified for Purposes of Attorney Fee Suit
In Wilkes v. United States,2 9 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
government was not "substantially justified" when it took a position in
a case of first impression that was inconsistent with the plain language
of the governing statute.210 Private parties who prevail "'in any
administrative or court proceeding which is brought by or against the
United States in connection with the determination, collection, or refund
of any tax, interest, or penalty'" are entitled to attorney fees.21' In
Wilkes the underlying case concerned whether an estate was liable for
the portion of the estate tax liability that an employee stock ownership
plan ("ESOP") agreed to pay.2 12 The estate argued that the executor
was discharged in his representative capacity.213

Conversely, the

government argued that the statute discharged the executor's personal
liability and that the estate remained liable. The district court
concluded that the executor was discharged in his representative
capacity. Thereafter, the estate filed a motion for attorney fees, arguing
that the government's position lacked substantial justification. 214 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
The Eleventh Circuit
in awarding attorney fees to the estate.21
rejected the government's argument that its position was substantially

207. Id. at 1332.
208. Id. at 1333-34.
209.

289 F.3d 684 (11th Cir. 2002).

210. Id. at 689-90.
211. Id. at 686 (quoting I.R.C. § 7430(a)).
212. Id. at 688-89. After decedent died, the executor agreed to sell shares of stock
previously owned by decedent to an ESOP. The executor elected to have I.R.C. § 2210
apply, which relieved the executor of liability for a portion of the estate taxes if an ESOP
bought the employer securities and agreed to pay that portion of the estate tax liability.
The ESOP agreed to pay a portion of the estate taxes due but failed to do so. After the
ESOP defaulted, the IRS tried to collect the unpaid estate taxes from the estate. Id. at
685.
213. I.R.C. § 2210(a) provided: "The executor is relieved of liability for the payment
of that portion of the tax ...

which such ...

[ESOP] is required to pay.'"

Id. at 688

(quoting I.R.C. § 2210(a) (1988)).
214. Id. at 686. "A position that is 'substantially justified' is one that is justified to a
reasonable degree that could satisfy a reasonable person or that has a reasonable basis in
both law and fact." Id. at 688 (citing In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994)).
215. Id.
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2 16
justified on the grounds that the case was one of first impression.
The court explained that all of the considerations of statutory construction indicated that "the term 'executor' refers to the executor in his
representative capacity."2 17 The mere possibility that the term executor could mean personal capacity, without any plausible reason why it
should, was not sufficient.218

C. Injunction Against Accountants as Tax PreparersIs Appropriate
When They Continually and Repeatedly Engaged in Prohibited
Conduct
In United States v. Ratfield,2 19 the federal district court held that
accountants who repeatedly and continually engaged in proscribed
conduct were properly enjoined from acting as tax preparers in the
future. 221 In Ratfield the government alleged that accountant defendants marketed arrangements involving the transfer of individual
taxpayers' businesses to common law trusts. After the transfer, the
business income and expenses were reported on the trust income tax
return as profit and loss from a business. Some of the items deducted
against the trust income in these cases included taxpayer's personal
living expenses, medical bills, contributions to private pension plans, and
Additionally, federal income tax
ordinary insurance premiums.
liabilities of the trust purchasers were artificially reduced by employing
the trust purchaser as the general manager of the trust, which paid the
individual taxpayer a yearly salary instead of the income. This trust
arrangement produced a significant understatement of the trust
purchaser's federal tax liabilities. Accountant defendants promoted
these trusts, having sold over one hundred of them.22 1 A court may
award injunctive relief prohibiting specific conduct if the court finds that
a tax preparer has engaged in activity that contravenes § 7407(b), which
includes any "fraudulent... conduct which substantially interferes with

216.
217.
218.
219.
2002).
220.
221.

Id. at 689-90.
1d. at 688-89.
Id. at 689.
No. 01-8816-CIV-FERGUSON, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21450 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29,
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *2-4.
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if the court finds that an income tax return preparer has continually
or repeatedly engaged in any conduct described in [7407(d)(1)] and that
an injunction prohibiting such conduct would not be sufficient to
prevent such person's interference with the proper administration of
[income tax laws], the court may enjoin such person from acting as an
income tax return preparer.225
Thus, the court concluded that the injunction was proper.2 4
VII.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LAW FOR TAXEXEMPT POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
The most important tax case decided in the Eleventh Circuit in 2002
was National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. United States. 225
NationalFederationis important because it addressed constitutional law
issues, as opposed to statutory issues, that relate to tax law. Specifically, the issues in National Federation were (1) whether tax-exempt
political organizations have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of a disclosure statute, and (2) whether that disclosure statute is
constitutional under the First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.226 The district court concluded that taxexempt political organizations have standing to challenge the disclosure
statute.227 Further, the court held that the disclosure
statute itself is
28
constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part.

222. I.R.C. § 7407(b) provides that an injunction is appropriate if the court finds that
the income tax preparer has:
(A) engaged in any conduct subject to penalty under [§]6694 or 6695, or subject
to any criminal penalty provided by this title,
(B) misrepresented his eligibility to practice before the Internal Revenue Service,
or otherwise misrepresented his experience or education as an income tax
preparer,
(C) guaranteed the payment of any tax refund or the allowance of any tax credit,
or
(D) engaged in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which substantially
interferes with the proper administration of the Internal Revenue laws, and [the
Court finds]
(2) that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent the recurrence of such conduct.
223. I.R.C. § 7407.
224. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21450, at *9-11.
225. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
226. Id. at 1307.
227. Id. at 1313.
228. Id. at 1354-55,

FEDERAL TAXATION

2003]

1589

A political organization is organized and operated primarily for the
purpose of accepting contributions or making expenditures for an exempt
function.2 29 The exempt function is essentially the function of influencing the public election process. 230 A political organization is generally
subject to income taxation on its taxable income. 2a Taxable income is
the excess of gross income for the year (minus exempt function income)
over allowed deductions that are directly connected with the production
of that income (minus exempt function income), subject to certain
modifications. 3 2
Exempt function income includes contributions,
membership dues, proceeds from political fund-raising not received in
the ordinary course of a trade or business, and proceeds from § 513(f)(2)
bingo games. 23 3 The tax rate imposed on taxable income is generally
thirty-five percent, the highest corporate rate.23 4 Thus, a political
organization receives an exemption from tax to the extent that its
income relates to its principal purpose of influencing elections.
Congress recently added two disclosure provisions to § 527: §§ 527(i)
and 527(j). The first disclosure provision, § 527(i), provides that a
political organization is not treated as such unless it discloses to the
government its name, address, purpose, and the identity of certain
related persons.23 5
Political organizations that anticipate gross
receipts of less than $25,000 in a year or that are subject to Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA7)235 disclosure do not have to
make § 527(i) disclosures.2 7 A political organization that does not
make a § 527(i) disclosure when required loses the tax exemption for its
exempt function income. 38
The second disclosure provision, § 527j), provides that a political
organization that accepts a contribution or makes an expenditure for an

229. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2000).
230. Id. § 527(e)(D). An "exempt function" is:
the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination,
election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public
office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or
Vice-Presidential electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected,
nominated, elected, or appointed.

Id.
231.
232.
233.

Id. § 527(a), (b)(1).
Id. § 527(c)(1).
Id. § 527(c)(3).

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See id. §§ 527(b)(1), 11(b)(1)(D).
Id. § 527(i)(1)-(3).
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000).
I.R.C. § 527(i)(5)-(6).
Id. § 527(i)(4).
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exempt function must make additional disclosures to the IRS.2" 9 These
additional disclosures include (1) the amount of any expenditure in
excess of $500 and the name and address of the recipient, and (2) the
amount of any contribution in excess of $200 and the name and address
of the contributors.240 Organizations that do not have to make § 527(i)
disclosures, namely political committees and organizations that make
independent expenditures, do not have to make § 527(j) disclosures.24 '
Organizations that fail to make required § 527(j) disclosures are taxed
on the amount to which the failure relates.24 2 The political organizations in National Federation alleged that § 527(j) disclosure requirements violated their First Amendment free speech and association
rights, their Fifth Amendment equal protection rights, and the Tenth
Amendment. In addition to disputing these constitutional law claims,
the government argued that the political assembly plaintiffs lacked
standing to make the claims."4
A. Tax-Exempt PoliticalOrganizationsHave Standing to Challenge
the Constitutionalityof the Disclosure Statute
The political assembly plaintiffs in NationalFederationwere "political
organizations." None of the assembly plaintiffs made § 527(i) disclosures, however, and all of them had a decline in contributions due to
contributors' concerns regarding identity disclosure. The government
claimed that these political assemblies lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the § 527(j) disclosure statute.24
Standing requires three elements: (1) injury in fact, (2) causal
connection between the injury and the aggrieved conduct, and (3)
likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 4 5
The government claimed that the political assembly plaintiffs lacked
standing because they had not made § 527(i) disclosures and were not,
therefore, required to make § 527(j) disclosures. Thus, the government
2 46
contended that the assembly plaintiffs had not suffered any injury.

The court rejected this claim, explaining that even though the political
assembly plaintiffs were not required to make § 527() disclosures, they
suffered injury because the law forced them to choose between privacy

239. Id. § 5270X2).
240. Id. § 527(j)(3).

241. Id. § 527(jX5).
242. Id. § 527(j)(1).
243. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.

244. Id.
245. Id. at 1308.
246. Id.
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with respect to their larger contributions and disclosing those larger
contributions. 7 According to the court, either option had adverse
economic consequences: not disclosing meant that plaintiffs would pay
a penalty and disclosing meant that they might lose larger contributions
from those who were unwilling to publicize their support.24 The court
concluded that both of these potential consequences satisfied the "injury"
requirement of standing. 249
Even though the government did not challenge the other constitutionally mandated elements of standing, the court determined that they were
satisfied..2 ' The political assemblies' "injury [was] fairly traceable to
[§] 527(j) because, but for that statute, they would still be able to avoid
[the penalty] without disclosing their larger contributions and expenditures."25 1 Further, the court explained that "[a] favorable decision
[would] strike down [§1 527(j), redressing the Assembly plaintiffs' injury
by eliminating its source." 252 The court concluded that plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 527(j). 25
B.

Constitutionalityof the Disclosure Statute

1. Disclosure statute violates First Amendment with regard to
expenditures, but not contributions. The political organizations'
first constitutional law claim was that § 527(j) disclosure violated their
First Amendment free speech rights. 25 The decision in Buckley v.
Valeo2. 5 is ordinarily applied to determine the constitutionality under
the First Amendment of disclosure requirements that affect political
If Buckley applies, the disclosure requirements must be
speech.2
substantially related to an important governmental interest. 2 7 The
government argued, however, that § 527(j) merely conditions a tax
exemption on disclosure, thus satisfying the First Amendment independent of Buckley.258 Therefore, one issue in National Federation was
whether § 5270) denied a tax subsidy because of speech, in which case

247. Id. at 1310.
248. Id at 1308-10.
249. Id. at 1310.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id.
I&
Id. at 1313.
Id.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
218 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64).
Id.(citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64).
Id.
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Buckley would apply,25 9 or whether it denied a subsidy that underwrites speech, in which case Buckley would not apply.26 The court
explained that the § 527 tax exemption underwrites political speech.2 6'
As such, the statute provides a subsidy that "'has much the same effect
as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have
to pay on [this] income.'"262 The court stated that "[tihis subsidy
effectively allows the political organization to increase its expenditures
and thus its speech."2" Because of this subsidy, the court concluded
that, as applied to contributions, § 527(j) does not implicate the First
Amendment.2 64
The political organizations argued that § 527 does not grant a tax
exemption because Congress lacks authority to tax political speech due
265
to its "'unique character as First Amendment protected activity.'
Therefore, the political organizations claimed that § 527(j) could not
offset any exemption from tax. Instead, they argued that § 527(j)
imposed an additional penalty tax that implicated the First Amendment.2'
The court acknowledged that § 527 could not grant a tax
exemption for contributions unless the exempted contributions were
initially subject to income tax.26 7 However, the court explained that
§ 527 does not tax contributors for exercising their right to contribute. 26
Rather, it taxes the recipient political organization on its
income. 2 9 Because the federal income tax is a "generally applicable"
tax, the court concluded that "the First Amendment does not immunize
political contributions from income taxation."27 The political organizations also claimed that even if the First Amendment does not prohibit
an income tax on political contributions, the Code does because (1) they

259. For example, in the case of the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) tax exemption that prohibits
lobbying, the First Amendment is implicated because the government penalizes taxpayers
for engaging in speech. Id. at 1313-14 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)).
260. Id. at 1314. For example, in the case of the I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) tax-exemption, which
allows lobbying but denies the ability to receive tax-deductible contributions, the First
Amendment is not implicated because Congress "'merely refused to pay for the [speech] out
of public monies.'" Id. (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 54546 (1983) (alteration in original)).
261. Id.
262. Id. (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 544) (alteration in original).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1322.
265. Id. at 1314 (quoting Plaintiffs' Brief at 8, 10).

266. Id.
267. Id.

268. Id. at 1315.
269. Id.
270. Id.

2003]

FEDERAL TAXATION

1593

are not gross income,27 1 (2) they are gifts exempted from gross in-

come,272 or (3) they are conduit payments.273 The court rejected each
of these claims because (1) the legislative history of § 527 says nothing
about shielding contributions from tax, (2) the view of contributions as
gifts is unsupportable, and (3) the conduit theory does not apply because
contributions are not generally held by the organizations as agents of
contributors. 274 Thus, because political contributions are gross income,
"they are subject to income tax unless effectively excluded from tax
elsewhere in the Code."2 75 The court concluded that § 527 grants such
a tax exemption.276
The court in National Federation outlined an important difference
between disclosure of contributions and disclosure of expenditures for
First Amendment analysis purposes.271 The difference relates to the
extent to which the penalty tax imposed for failing to make § 527(j)
disclosures exceeds the amount of tax otherwise exempted by § 527.278
While a law may withdraw a tax subsidy that underwrites taxpayer
speech without implicating the First Amendment, if Congress does more
than cancel a subsidy, the law must satisfy Buckley.279 Regarding
contributions, § 527(j) does no more than offset the subsidy (tax
exemption) enjoyed by political organizations that give notice under
§ 527(i). 2 0 Regarding expenditures, however, the penalty for failing
to make § 527(j) disclosures is imposed in exactly the amount of tax
exemption the organization would receive for the same amount of exempt
income."' To the extent the political organization's exempt-function
expenditures of $500 or more exceed its tax-exempt income from
undisclosed sources, § 527(j) ceases to represent the offset of a subsidy
and becomes an additional exaction.' 2 Thus, § 527(j) virtually guarantees that the penalty imposed will exceed the amount of the political
organization's tax-exemption because the effect is not simply to tax that
which has been exempted. To the extent the political organization's

271. Gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived," except as
otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Code. I.R.C. § 61(a).
272. Id. § 102(a).
273. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1315-17.
274. Id. at 1315-18.
275. Id. at 1318.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1318-22.
278. Id. at 1319-20.
279. Id. at 1322.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.

1594

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

exempt-function expenditures exceed its tax-exempt income, § 527(j)
must satisfy the analysis under Buckley to survive the First Amendment
challenge. 8
Obtaining information about candidates' constituencies is an
important governmental interest under Buckley." 4 Additionally, the
disclosure requirements in Buckley were the least restrictive means of
accomplishing this informational interest. 285 Buckley thus establishes
that "Congress may constitutionally require disclosures of organizations
28
whose major purpose is the nomination or election of candidates."
A political organization is an organization whose primary purpose is to
influence the selection of individuals for public office,28 7 much like the
political committees at issue in Buckley. 288 However, § 527(j)'s expenditure disclosure requirements are much narrower than the disclosure
requirements of FECA (the statute at issue in Buckley). Whereas
§ 527(j) requires disclosure for expenditures of $500 or more, FECA's
Also, § 527(j)
disclosure requirements are triggered at $100.01.289
requires disclosure only of specific identifying information about the
recipient, whereas FECA requires disclosure of both the purpose of each
expenditure and the identity of the candidate to be assisted by the
In a constitutional analysis, these differences are
expenditure. 2
material. 29' FECA's expenditure disclosure requirements advanced the
informational interest by "provid[ing] information linking the expenditure to a particular candidate." 2" Under § 527(j), however, political
organizations are not required to identify the candidate. 29 3 Thus,
except when identifying the recipient provides this information, such as
when the candidate is the recipient, "[§] 527(j) is not calculated to
advance the governmental interest on which Buckley rested."2 4 Thus,
the court concluded that "[§] 527(j) violate[d] the First Amendment to

283. Id.
284. Id. at 1330 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80). Such information helps voters define
the candidates' constituencies, alerts voters to candidates' likely interests, and allows
voters to better compare candidates to one another. Id.
285. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
286. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1330.
287. I.R.C. § 527(eX1), (2).
288. See 424 U.S. at 7-8.
289. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-33.
290. Id. at 1333.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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the extent it purported to require political organizations to disclose
expenditures. "29
2. Disclosure statute does not violate Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection to the extent it requires contribution disclosure, but
it does to the extent it requires expenditure disclosure. The
political organizations argued that § 527(j) disclosure violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The organizations claimed that § 527(j) singles them out for disclosures
without requiring the same of other tax-exempt organizations that
receive political contributions (or make political expenditures) but do not
receive contributions or make expenditures as their primary purpose.2" Because political speech is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny
is required if the statute burdens this speech.297 However, the government's decision not to subsidize speech is not subject to strict scrutiny.298 Thus, the conditioning of a tax benefit, though it may adversely
impact the taxpayer's speech, requires only rational basis review.2 "
With respect to contributions, § 527(j) only offsets a tax benefit, but with
respect to expenditures, it results in an additional exaction. 300 Accordingly, the court concluded that rational basis scrutiny applied to
plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to contribution disclosure, while
strict scrutiny applied to their challenge to expenditure disclosure. 30 '
Rational basis review of contribution disclosures for equal protection
purposes requires that there be "'a rational relationship between the
30 2
disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.'
The court noted that other tax-exempt organizations, such as labor
unions, are meaningfully different from political organizations because
influencing electoral results is not the primary focus of these other
organizations. 0 3 Given the government's informational interest in
§ 527(j) disclosure, the court concluded that it is "rational for Congress
to target those groups best able to influence electoral results."0 4 Thus,
§ 527(j) does not violate equal protection under the Fifth Amendment by

295. Id. at 1336.
296. Id. Plaintiffs identified such political organizations as labor unions, social welfare
organizations, and other organizations exempted from tax by § 501. Id.
297. Id. at 1336-37.
298. Id. at 1337.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1337-38.
301. Id. at 1338.
302. Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)).
303. Id.
304. Id.
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failing to require other tax-exempt organizations engaged in electoral
advocacy to make similar contribution disclosures."' °
Strict scrutiny review of expenditure disclosures for equal protection
purposes requires that "'statutory classifications impinging upon a
fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest."'06 Thus, strict scrutiny required the government in National Federationto identify the characteristics of political
organizations that make them, but not other similarly engaged
tax-exempt organizations, appropriate subjects for required expenditure
disclosures."0 7
The legislative history of § 527(j) identifies two essential characteristics of political organizations: "(1) their primary purpose is to influence
election results, and (2) the public cannot identify their supporters from
their names."30 8 These explanations were insufficient under strict
scrutiny because nothing in the record explained why it was more
important to require expenditure disclosures of political organizations
than for other tax-exempt organizations. 3 °9 The court explained that
while a primary purpose of influencing elections is a difference between
the political organizations and other tax-exempt groups, it is not "a
meaningful difference in a critical characteristic justifying different
expenditure disclosure requirements."' 0 Further, the only compelling
purpose suggested by the legislative history of § 527(j) is that extending
the disclosure requirements to other tax-exempt organizations would
raise First Amendment concerns.3 ' However, to the extent that other
tax-exempt organizations receive contributions for electoral advocacy,
Congress could condition tax-exemption on the disclosure of expenditures. 12 Thus, the potential unconstitutionality of requiring other
tax-exempt organizations to disclose expenditures is not a compelling
reason for treating such organizations better than political organizations
with respect to such disclosure. s3 The court concluded that § 527(j)
violated Fifth Amendment Equal Protection guarantees to the extent it
requires political organizations to disclose expenditures. 3"

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1339.
(quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990)).
at 1340-41.
at 1341.

309. Id.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id. at 1343-44.
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3. Disclosure statute violates Tenth Amendment to the extent
it requires disclosures connected to federal electoral advocacy,
but not to state advocacy. Although Congress clearly has authority
to regulate federal elections, plaintiffs in National Federation argued
that § 527(j) "violates the Tenth Amendment to the extent it purports to
require disclosures of political organizations operating in the state and
local arena." 15 The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."316 Thus, under the Tenth Amendment, the issue in National
Federationwas whether federal disclosure in state and local elections is
a matter that "but for the Constitution, would be subject to state
sovereignty." 7 Although regulation of state and local electoral
advocacy is an attribute of state sovereignty, this does not establish that
such regulation is reserved to the states. 8 ' As the court stated, "[I]f
the power Congress exercised was delegated to it, that power cannot
have been reserved to the states.""1 ' However, before addressing
Congress's power to impose disclosure requirements for state and local
electoral advocacy, Congressional intent must be considered."0 The
court concluded that Congress clearly expressed its intention by defining
"political organization" as any organization whose primary purpose is to
influence the selection of an individual for state or local office.3 2' The
only exclusion possibly exempting political organizations in state and
local electoral advocacy 22 does not reach all political organizations
engaged in such advocacy. 23 Thus, because Congress clearly ex-

315. Id. at 1344.
316. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
317. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
318. Id. at 1344-45.
319. Id. at 1345.
320. Id.; see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461, 464 (1991).
321. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 (citing I.R.C. § 527(e)(1)-(2)).
322. See I.R.C. § 527j)(5XB) (providing an exclusion for "any State or local committee
of a political party or political committee of a State or local candidate").
323. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1346. The court explains:
A "committee of a political party" plainly cannot extend to a political organization
not affiliated with a political party. The term "political committee of a State or
local candidate," while somewhat less precise, cannot plausibly be stretched to
mean, "all political organizations engaged in state or local electoral advocacy."
Section 527 identifies a "committee" as only one form of organization constituting
a political organization, [I.R.C.] § 527(e)(1), so that an exclusion for a "committee"
cannot be an exclusion for other forms of organization falling within [§] 527.
Moreover, the only committees excluded are those "of' a state or local candidate;
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pressed its intent to regulate state and local electoral advocacy, the issue
was whether Congress's enactment of § 527(j) was done pursuant to a
power delegated by the Constitution.3 24
The government claimed that Congress's taxing power supports
§ 527(j)'s application to state and local elections.3 5 The court rejected
this claim.3 26 The court agreed that because every tax is in some way
regulatory, "'a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory
effect."'3 27 A tax having a regulatory effect can become a mere penalty,
however, at which point the statute violates the Tenth Amendment."
Thus, the constitutionality of § 527(j) "depends on whether Congress
intended to exercise its constitutional power to tax or intended instead
to regulate state and local [elections]."3 29 The court concluded that
Congress clearly designated the fee imposed for failure to make § 527
disclosures as a "penalty," that is, a sanction for the failure to disclose
contributions and expenditures for state and local elections.33 The
court rejected the government's claim that § 527(j) has a revenue
purpose, which is "'ensuring that federal subsidies are not used in a
manner that might lead to corruption or would conceal the source of
campaign-related spending from the public. '"33" Indeed, the court
explained that to the extent § 527(j) imposes a penalty in excess of the
political organization's tax exemption (i.e., its federal subsidy), it is
imposed purely to coerce disclosures.3 2 Insofar as § 527(j) offsets a tax
exemption, it does not do so to raise revenue. 33 Additionally, the court
refused to consider § 527(j) disclosure as supporting a revenue purpose
because it does not assist in identifying taxpayers, confirming that
taxpayers are using the correct tax status, determining the amount of
tax liability, or collecting tax."3 4 Because § 527(j) is not a revenue
measure and does not serve any revenue purpose, the court in National
Federation concluded that it "reflects Congress's purpose to regulate

this possessive preposition cannot reasonably be read as extending the exclusion
beyond a candidate's own campaign committee.
Id.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

1347.
1348.
1347 (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)).
1347-48.
1349.
1350 (quoting Defendant's Brief at 14).
1351.
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state and local electoral advocacy and not to exercise its taxing
power."' 35 Accordingly, § 527(j) "violates the Tenth Amendment to the
extent that it purports to require disclosures of contributions
and
336
expenditures in connection with state and local advocacy."
IX.

CONCLUSION

The federal cases decided in 2002 that impact tax law in the Eleventh
Circuit are varied and enlightening. These cases show just how
expansive and rich tax law can be. The topics addressed by these cases
include business (e.g., payroll tax and corporate tax) and personal
matters (e.g., estate and gift tax, IRS authority to levy on entirety
property, and IRAs), statutory and constitutional law issues, and
liability for tax obligations incurred by third persons. It is also
instructive that the government prevailed in an overwhelming majority
of these tax cases. Thus, a taxpayer who hopes to escape liability for the
most basic of civic responsibilities-paying taxes-faces a significant
challenge. Many of the cases in which taxpayers were held liable seem
a bit extreme, such as when restaurants were held liable for taxes on
estimates of income they never paid, when officers or directors were held
liable for taxes that another person was supposed to pay, and when an
estate was denied a charitable deduction for monies paid to charity.
Nevertheless, this severity is necessary in order to maintain the
integrity of a voluntary compliance federal taxation system.

335. Id. at 1352.
336, Id.

